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by firms. The econometric evidence suggests that 
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It is so widely recognized that innovation is a key driver of economic growth that it is cliché to say so. 
Existing literature from economics and international business (IB) on innovation and firm performance in 
different contextual environments can be divided into three distinct hypotheses, which we call the Global 
Engagement, the Information Spillovers, and the Market Structure hypotheses. The Global Engagement 
hypothesis posits that firms engaged in global business activities, through foreign investment, adoption of 
foreign technologies, or through imports of capital goods are more likely to undertake innovations than 
other firms. The Information Spillovers hypothesis suggests that firms can learn from aggregate 
accumulated knowledge even if they have not made the research and development investments to produce 
this knowledge. The implication is that firms that have broader access to commercial knowledge, 
including by adopting foreign technologies, will tend to have higher propensities to innovate than 
otherwise similar firms. Market Structure hypotheses have a long tradition, but with seemingly 
contradictory predictions about firm innovation. One possibility is that competition and the threat of entry 
can stimulate innovation by incumbent firms. Some studies predict, however, that firms that are far from 
the technological frontier will tend to have low propensities to innovate.  
This article pushes forward the research agenda in International Business (IB) focused on how 
contextual factors affect firm performance, which can motivate future theories to help us narrow the 
existing gap between micro theories of firm performance and macro theories of the contextual 
environment (Bamberger, 2008). In addition, the IB literature has emphasized multi-level analysis, 
covering national, industry, firm, and even project characteristics, for understanding firm performance for 
some time (Luo, 2001). While there are numerous examples of multi-level analysis of how contextual 
environments affect firm performance, including analyses of the role of cultural differences (Tihany et al., 
2005), corruption (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002), economic integration (Benito et al. 2003), and economic 
reforms in transition economies (Park et al., 2006), none cover the breadth or the scope of multi-level 
factors on firm performance in general nor product innovation in particular that are covered in this article. 
While contemporary IB literature stresses multi-level analysis, which is often required to identify the true 
effect of firm choices such as Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) organizational models on subsidiary 
performance and innovation (Venaik et al., 2005), such examples remain scarce in the IB literature. 
Moreover, there are no contributions to the IB literature that test multiple hypotheses, covering variables 
measured a multiple levels of analysis, in a nested empirical model of firm innovation probabilities 
covering both domestic and foreign-owned firms.  
  1This article examines the empirical determinants of the probability of product innovation in a 
large sample of over 25,000 manufacturing firms from around the world, covering 68 developing and 
high-income economies and eight manufacturing industries. We assess the merits of the three alternative 
sets of hypotheses related to microeconomic and macroeconomic determinants of the probability of 
product innovation by incumbent firms. This multi level analysis, encompassing the firm, industry and 
country levels of analysis, thus provides a novel nested empirical assessment of competing hypotheses 
regarding the nature of the probability of product innovation. The econometric evidence supports the 
Global Engagement and Informational Spillover hypotheses at both the firm and national levels of 
analysis, but provides mixed evidence for the Market Structure hypotheses.  
Three sets of hypotheses on the probability of product innovation in economics and IB 
Even in the context of high-income countries, the determinants of the probability of product innovation 
across firms might be different from those of patentable innovation. In the IB literature, there has been 
some analysis of how patents can help solve informational problems that affect firm valuations (Heeley et 
al. 2007). When innovation, including product innovation, cannot be patented, then the incentives facing 
firms to introduce new products are somewhat different. In the economics literature, Criscuolo, Haskel, 
and Slaughter (2005) find in a panel of firms from the United Kingdom that the correlates of patents and 
product innovation are different, particularly with respect to the role played by linkages between firms 
and universities, the latter being more important for patentable innovations. Another example is the study 
by Aghion et al. (2006) that found that the response of U.K. firms (measured by productivity changes and 
patenting) to increased competition due to the regulatory reforms of the Thatcher government was 
different across firms, depending on their distance to the technological frontier (the productivity gap with 
respect to the most productive firms in each industry). Yet we still have much to learn about the empirical 
correlates of product innovation around the world.  
The Global Engagement literature 
A distinct literature concerns the relationship between Global Engagement and innovation by firms. One 
strand of this literature, surveyed by Keller (2004), focuses on the role of international technology 
diffusion. That is, firms might be able to innovate and improve their productivities if they have access to 
imports of foreign technology or capital goods used for production. Eaton and Kortum (1996), however, 
found that imports are not necessarily correlated with technology flows proxied by patent applications, 
after controlling for bilateral distance among trading partners in the context of the gravity model of trade. 
More recent evidence provided by MacGarvie (2006) with French firm data combined with data on patent 
  2citations suggests that innovative firms (in terms of patent applications) that import inputs from abroad 
tend to have significantly higher propensities to cite foreign technologies in their patent applications. 
French exporters, in contrast, do not seem to cite foreign patents in their patent applications more than 
other firms. These aforementioned studies focus on a particular type of innovation related to patents, 
which might not be common across countries. Criscuolo et al. (2005) explore the determinants of firm 
innovation indicators, including product and process innovation, with firm data from the United 
Kingdom. They found that exporters and multinational corporations do tend to have higher propensities 
for product and process innovation than other firms. We call this the Global Engagement hypothesis, and 
the firms’ license payments for foreign technologies, foreign investment, and international trade policies 
are relevant variables for assessing its validity. This type of effect needs to be examined jointly with the 
effects of foreign competition on the innovation decisions of incumbent firms, as per the Market Structure 
hypotheses discussed below. 
In the IB literature, Benito et al. (2003) study how MNE subsidiaries performed across three 
Nordic countries that had different levels of formal integration with the European Union (EU), thus 
offering a unique test of how international engagement brought about by policy changes affect the 
behavior and performance of subsidiaries. The authors found evidence from survey data that subsidiaries 
in Norway, the “outsider” country that is less integrated with the EU, report both fewer activities and 
lower levels of competence than subsidiaries in Denmark and Finland, after controlling for other 
determinants of performance. Thus this study supports the central tenet of the Global Engagement 
literature.  
The Information Spillovers literature 
A second literature can be labeled the Information Spillovers hypothesis, whereby an innovation by one 
firm can benefit imitators. This is due to the fact that new ideas can benefit all firms, not just the 
innovative firm. In the economics and IB literatures, this is called the appropriability problem (Heeley et 
al., 2007). An influential contribution to this literature is Klette and Kortum (2004), which was motivated 
by empirical patterns observed in rich-country firm data. One such pattern is that investments in R&D as 
a share of sales does not seem to be strictly correlated with the size of firms, thus contradicting some of 
the earlier Market Structure literature reviewed by Cohen and Levine (1989). Rather, the decision to 
invest in R&D depends on the expected future profits generated by the new product, which in turns 
depends on the ability of potential competitors to imitate such innovations. Hence in the Information 
Spillovers literature, the threat of entry matters, but so do the positive spillovers from previously 
generated knowledge. Another influential piece comes from the development economics literature, 
  3namely Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), which is concerned about product innovation for exports in 
developing countries, where most product innovations are presumably not patentable as they entail the 
production of existing products that are nevertheless not yet produced in a country. To assess this 
hypothesis we use data on the accumulated number of patents granted by the U.S. patent agency to 
inventors residing in different countries.  
The Market Structure literature 
One strand of the economics literature focused on industrial organization can be traced to the 
Schumpeterian idea of creative destruction, whereby innovation can be seen as both cause and 
consequence of competitive pressures characterized by Market Structure. The empirical literature linking 
firm innovation and market structure has assessed two issues, namely whether innovation rises with the 
size of the firm or with market concentration in terms of the market share of firms (Cohen and Levin 
1989). This literature has produced only ambiguous results with various studies finding contradictory 
evidence.  
An important theoretical contribution to this literature was Reinganum (1985). The main insight 
concerned an ambiguous relationship between the extent of market competition and innovation by 
incumbent firms. The threat of firm entry with new or higher quality products can affect incumbents’ 
incentives to invest in R&D or other investments associated with product innovation. In Reinganum’s 
model, every firm has a temporary monopoly over its product, which dissipates when a challenging firm 
introduces an improved version of that product. The theoretical model proposed by Aghion et al. (2005) 
builds on the types of models pioneered by Reinganum by allowing incumbent firms to innovate. Market 
competition through new entrants therefore can have different effects on incumbents’ decisions to 
innovate, depending on each firm’s assessment of the expected difference between profits before and after 
innovation. Laggard firms that are far from the technological frontier need to spend a lot of resources to 
move them towards that frontier, and therefore could choose to reduce their expenditures in innovation to 
reduce costs. In contrast, firms close to the frontier need to spend relatively little to keep them ahead of 
potential new entrants, and thus could increase their innovation efforts in the face of rising competition. 
These contradictory effects on firms that differ in terms of their technological capabilities yield the so-
called inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation. We call these the Market Structure 
hypotheses, and we test them by examining the role of firm size and the regulatory environment that 
affects the costs and timing of firm entry.  
  4The IB literature has also paid attention to how global and domestic competition affects the 
performance of firms. For instance, we know from surveys of managers of MNE subsidiaries that global 
competition and organizational structures interact to produce different learning and innovation outcomes 
(Veniak et al., 2005). That is, MNEs that encourage organizational learning by subsidiaries tend to 
respond to competitive pressures through greater innovation. Hence the IB literature also provides 
ambiguous answers to the question of how market structure affects firm performances, even across MNE 
subsidiaries, because the outcomes depend on MNE organizational structure.  
Hypotheses to be tested in a nested empirical model 
As discussed above, the existing literatures related to product innovation make various predictions about 
the probability of product innovation by incumbent firms, which can be summarized in seven hypotheses. 
The Global Engagement hypotheses are:  
  Hypothesis 1. Importing foreign know-how through licensing, foreign investment and exporting 
activities are positively correlated with product innovation. 
  Hypothesis 2. Trade-policy distortions that raise the costs of global engagement deter innovation.   
The Information Spillovers hypotheses are: 
  Hypothesis 3. Firms’ R&D and the education of its personnel increase the probability of product 
innovation. Although these firm-level variables do not capture inter-firm learning spillovers, they 
do capture firms’ adoptive capacities.  
  Hypothesis 4. The density of knowledge available to local firms in their local context spurs 
innovation.  
The Market Structure hypotheses are:  
  Hypothesis 5. The size of firms is positively correlated with the probability of product innovation.  
  Hypothesis 6. The regulatory environment can have either positive or negative effects on the 
probability of product innovation by incumbent firms. 
  Hypothesis 7. The degree of market competition characterized by business density can raise or 
reduce the probability of product innovation by existing firms.  
  5 
Data  
The firm-level data come from the World Bank’s numerous Investment Climate Surveys (ICS) and 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) conducted in various countries in 
various years, which are listed in the Data Appendix. There is substantial overlap between the ICS and 
BEEPS questionnaires, but there are differences in sampling approaches.  
The surveys 
The ICS tend to focus on manufacturing firms; the BEEPS are drawn from a broad range of economic 
activities including services (actually the BEEPS database is slightly skewed towards services). We 
restricted the coverage of the BEEPS data to firms in the manufacturing sectors.  
The coverage of the BEEPs and ICS data in terms of the sampling of firms is also different. The 
BEEPS used quota sampling, whereby 10 percent of selected firms are small, with the number of 
employees in the 2-49 range; another 10 percent were firms with 250-999 employees, and the rest were 
randomly selected in between those two extremes. The ICS survey sampling approaches differed across 
countries. In some cases, quotas by sector and size were used. In others, existing industrial census shares 
by industries and size were used as benchmark sampling quotas. Thus, there might be some selectivity of 
the sampled firms, which might raise doubts about the randomness of the sample. If we were attempting 
to draw conclusions for each country specifically, these cross-survey and cross-country differences in 
sampling would be important impediments. Our objective is more modest, as we want to draw general 
conclusions about the probability of product innovation by incumbent firms from around the world. It is 
possible that selective sampling for each country but for numerous countries can yield representative 
samples for the world, because the statistical requirements for representativeness are less restrictive than 
for smaller sub-samples. Thus we interpret our statistical results with caution, and discuss results with 
different samples.  
Multi-level explanatory variables and hypotheses 
Three levels of analysis are used in our empirical model, namely firm-, sector- and country-level 
variables. The first set includes the dependent variable: the introduction of a new product. The surveys 
asked managers whether the firm had introduced a new product during the past two years. Hence our 
dependent variable is a dichotomous dummy variable.  
  6Regarding explanatory variables motivated by the aforementioned literatures, firm characteristics 
that may affect a firm’s proclivity to innovate include the following: The Market Structure literature 
suggests that firm size matters, which we measure by the natural logarithm of the number of permanent 
and temporary workers and its squared term (to test for a nonlinear relationship). The Global Engagement 
hypothesis motivates the inclusion of firms’ exporter status, measured by a dummy variable equal to 1 
when a firm exports at least 10 percent of its sales; and foreign ownership of the firm, measured by a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for foreign ownership when more than 10 percent of assets of the firm are 
owned by foreigners. The surveys also provide information on variables motivated by the Information 
Spillovers literature, such as whether firms invested in R&D, a dummy variable. Because the literature on 
Information Spillovers, as well as the Global Engagement hypothesis, has paid much attention to the 
adoption of foreign technologies, we also use data derived from a question in the surveys that asked 
managers whether the firm had paid licensing fees during the past two years. This variable is also 
dichotomous, and the estimates of the effect of R&D and licensing status are thus comparable.  
The Global Engagement literature is also related to trade policies, which are observed at the 
sector-level. We use a composite index of the average applied tariffs and its standard deviation. The index 
was estimated as the first principal component derived from factor analysis, because the level of the 
average applied tariff within industries and across countries were highly correlated. Countries with high 
tariffs in a given sector also tend to have high tariff dispersion. Factor analysis allows for the construction 
of a single index comprising the information from highly correlated variables. The other trade policy 
indicator measured at the industry level is the share of tariff lines within each industry that faces one of 
the so-called “core” non-tariff barriers – see data Appendix. These data were taken from Nicita and 
Olarreaga (2006).  
Country-level variables capture various aspects of the local environment and context. They 
include an index of infrastructure coverage (from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database), 
institutional quality (from Kaufmann et al. 2005), and real manufacturing GDP growth (also from WDI). 
In some models, we also include the level of development (GDP per capita from the Penn World Tables). 
An important explanatory variable for our analysis, which is related to the Market Structure literature, is a 
regulatory index capturing the ease of entry. It was calculated from data from the World Bank’s Doing 
Business database. Due to high correlations among regulatory variables, we again use principal 
components analysis to calculate a composite index on the quality of governance (including (lack of) 
corruption, political stability, and rule of law) and the regulatory environment affecting the ease of entry 
of new firms (including Difficulty of Firing Index, Difficulty of Hiring Index and Days for Starting a 
Business). We also use patent-counts data from Lederman and Saenz (2005), namely the sum (stock) of 
  7utility patents granted to researchers in each country during 1963-2000 by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) per person. The latter provides a measure of the density of innovative ideas 
available to firms operating in each country.  
The literature on Market Structure studies how market concentration affects firms’ investments in 
innovation. We use data on “business density” from Djankov et al. (2007), which were recently added to 
the World Bank’s Doing Business database. This variable is defined as the (log of the) number of firms 
per capita. Although this variable does not directly measure market concentration, together with the 
variable on the regulatory environment, this variable sheds light on the role of policy and economic 
factors that determine market structure as they measure variables that affect the ease of entry into existing 
product markets. The data limited our sample to 40 countries, but section 4 also discusses results based on 
a broader sample of 58 countries, which was derived by imputing the missing values of the business 
density variable by exploiting the observed correlations between this variable and the other country 
characteristics.  
Some studies, such as Criscuolo et al. (2005), also treat explanatory variables measured at a 
higher level of aggregation than the firm level as exogenous factors, but these are measured with data 
from the firm surveys themselves. Our approach is different in this regard, as we use objective data from 
other sources. The use of aggregate variables derived from the same dataset as the firm data can be 
assumed to be exogenous only under certain conditions, namely firms’ deviations from the average must 
be orthogonal to the average and normally distributed with expected value of zero. We do not have to 
make any assumptions in this regard, because our data are objectively measured at the country level from 
data from other sources. The disadvantage of our approach is that we have fewer degrees of freedom to 
estimate the relevant coefficients of the variables measure at the national level, which is limited by the 
number of countries.  
Some of the surveys did not include certain data. The average years of education of the labor 
force was not available in 9 surveys. Table 1 reports the average and the standard deviation of the log of 
the number of years of education variable for two samples. One is the original sample of more than 
18,000 firms and the other is the sample of over 25,000, which corresponds to the one used in the 
estimations. The larger sample was constructed by imputing the education variable by using the observed 
correlations between education and the other firm-level characteristics, except the dependent variable (the 
dummy variable for product innovation). Table 1 shows the resulting sample average and dispersion, 
which are very similar to those of the original reduced sample. In the sub-samples of firms reporting a 
product innovation, the averages are 2.305 versus 2.303 and 0.564 versus 0.652 in the standard deviation. 
  8For the sub-samples of firms that did not report a product innovation, the averages are 2.232 versus 2.229 
and the standard deviations are 0.714 versus 0.855. In both cases, the differences in the averages are not 
statistically significant, but the addition of thousands of observations from nine countries allows us to 
study the cross-country determinants of product innovation rates with more precision.  
The trade-policy variables also turned out to limit the sample of countries. Hence we imputed the 
missing values of the NTB and tariff index with industry dummies and the other country variables, but 
not with the firm-level variables. Again, Table 1 shows that the within group averages and standard 
deviations of the original data and the imputed values are strikingly similar. We return to this issue in 
Section 4.  
Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for firms from 68 countries, the sample used in the econometric 
analysis discussed below. The number of firms by country appears in the Data Appendix. The data show 
diverse international product innovation rates, ranging from about 6.8 percent in Nepal to 77.8 percent in 
Peru. It is noteworthy that the percentages for countries with a Gross Domestic Product per capita above 
the World Bank’s high-income country threshold of $14,000 (purchasing-power adjusted as of 2000, 
which are identified with an asterisk in Table A1) are not above the cross-country average of 48.8 percent 
or the average for the overall sample of firms, which is 47.5 percent, as reported in Table 1.   
[Table 1 here] 
Table 1 also shows that a large share of firms that reported new products also report R&D 
expenditures. In the total sample, 60 percent of firms with product innovation also report R&D, whereas 
only 15 percent of non-innovative firms report some R&D expenditures. This pattern holds for most 
countries individually for R&D, but also for licensing, export status, and foreign ownership. China is the 
exception. In this country, the percentage of non-innovative firms that report R&D expenditures, licensing 
payments, exporting, and foreign ownership is higher than among innovative firms. The data for China is 
consistent with product-level export data that suggests that mainland China introduced comparatively few 
new export products during 1994-2003 (Klinger and Lederman, 2006).  
There is no clear relationship between trade policies and the share of innovative firms across 
countries, however. For example, Argentina appears with 75 percent of firms being innovative, but it also 
utilizes numerous non-tariff barriers (NTBs) covering, on average across the 8 manufacturing sectors, 
slightly over 29 percent of its tariff lines. In contrast, Bolivia has a low NTB coverage rate of about 3 
  9percent, but only 43 percent of firms reported a product innovation. It remains to be tested whether trade 
distortions affect the probability of product innovation after controlling for firm and country 
characteristics.  
A two-stage multi-level empirical model of the probability of product innovation 
Due to the dichotomous nature of our variable of interest, the empirical model of the probability of 
product innovation can be written as: 
(1)  ) ( ) , , | 1 ( c isc c s c sc ics c sc isc isc X X X X X X y P                    , 
where P is the probability of observing a value of one for product innovation, y. Subscript i represents 
firms, the s’s are eight manufacturing sectors, and c’s are countries. The Xs are matrices of the relevant 
explanatory variables, measure at the three levels of aggregation (firms, sectors, and countries). The betas, 
alphas, and deltas are the parameters to be estimated with a Probit estimator, which assumes a standard 
normal distribution of estimation errors.  isc   is, therefore, the standard white noise error. Below we report 
results that are robust to heteroskedasticity of regression errors clustered around the observations of each 
country,  c  . This correction is important to ascertain the statistical significance of parameters associated 
with industry and country variables when the dependent variable is a micro unit (Moulton, 1990).  
  The analysis proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, we discuss partial correlations of firm-level 
characteristics and industry trade-policy variables measured, which are estimated in models that also 
control for industry-, year-, and country- effects by including corresponding dummy variables for each 
industry, year, and country (the  s in equation 1). We recover the predicted probability rates by countries 
from this estimation, which are reported in the last column of Table A1 in the Data Appendix. The second 
stage explores national determinants of the average probabilities of product innovation. That is, country 
characteristics can affect the probability of product innovation by incumbent firms not only directly, but 
also by affecting firm-level characteristics that in turn help determine product innovation probabilities. 
The regression errors in this second stage model are unknown, because the dependent variable is an 
estimate. Consequently the standard errors from these regressions are bootstrapped, whereby each 
specification is estimated 50 times with randomly selected sub-samples of the data set. The resulting 
distribution of estimated parameters yields the statistical confidence intervals.  
  This two-stage approach provides confidence about the robustness of the results concerning firm-
level and trade-policy determinants of the probability of product innovation, because the country 
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incumbent firms, not just the variables motivated by the existing literatures. We discuss both sets of 
results separately, although some of the three sets of hypotheses are captured by variables measured at the 
three levels.  
  While the estimated partial correlations among the firm-level variables could be due to 
endogeneity, the results concerning the sector- and country-level variables are less likely to be 
contaminated by this problem. If each individual firm is too small to determine, for example, the level of 
a country’s trade protection or its aggregate level of patents accumulated since 1963, then the 
corresponding empirical relationships are likely to be due to causal effects.  
First stage results: the role of firm characteristics and industry trade policies 
The results from the estimation of five versions of equation (1) with the appropriate set of country, 
industry, and year dummy variables are presented in Table 2. The table reports the marginal coefficients, 
or the elasticities calculated at the sample mean, associated with the Probit coefficients of the continuous 
explanatory variables. The coefficients on dichotomous explanatory variables represent the effect of 
changing status.  
The first specification includes the dummy variable for R&D investments, but excludes the one 
for licensing foreign technologies. The latter is included in the second model. The third includes both. 
Columns 4 and 5 contain the results from specifications with the trade-policy variables, but the latter 
utilizes a smaller sample of firms from countries with GDP per capita below $14,000 (PPP) in the year 
2000. This change in sample does not affect the estimated coefficients in a meaningful way, thus 
suggesting that the results might reflect robust relationships among the variables in both developing and 
developed economies. Furthermore, we estimated all model specifications reported in Table 2 with 
alternative sub-samples of the data, first excluding firms from African countries and then excluding 
observations from East Asia and the Pacific countries. These results, which are not reported for the sake 
of brevity, confirmed the robustness of the results presented in Table 2.  
Evidence on global engagement 
Licensing is statistically significant with positive coefficients, even when the R&D variable is included 
simultaneously. In fact, the estimated marginal effects are consistently estimated across all specifications 
reported in Table 2.  
  11[Table 2 here] 
A result that goes against the Global Engagement hypotheses concerns the variable on foreign 
ownership, which is not significant in any specification. This result is consistent with IB literature that 
suggests that the performance of international joint ventures (IJV) depends on the relatedness of its 
products with those of its parent companies (Luo, 2002), which implies that product diversification by 
IJVs is only desirable when the parent companies are introducing new products. In contrast, the export-
status variable is significant and positive across all models. The marginal effect of exporting appears to be 
somewhat lower than the aforementioned effect of licensing. Overall, hypothesis 1 is accepted, with the 
exception of the foreign ownership variable.  
The coefficients concerning tariffs and non-tariff barriers are not statistically different from zero. 
Thus hypothesis 2 is rejected thus far. It remains to be seen whether cross-country differences in tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers matter. In any case, the estimated models perform well overall, as reflected in the 
predicted sample probabilities of innovation, which are strikingly close to the observed sample 
probabilities. The country-specific predicted probabilities compared to the observed probabilities reported 
in Appendix Table A1 reveal that our models are quite adequate.  
Evidence on information spillovers 
The effect of R&D is statistically significant. The effect of R&D is substantially larger than the effect of 
licensing. The former implies that investing in R&D is associated with an increase of 0.18 percent in the 
probability of product innovation by incumbent firms, whereas the effect of licensing is closer to 0.10 
percent. As expected, the level of education of the labor force is positively correlated with the probability 
of product innovation, with consistently estimated marginal effects across all specifications reported in 
Table 2. Hypothesis 3 is thus accepted, and hypothesis 4 is discussed in the following section.  
Evidence on market structure 
The size of firms, captured by the number of employees, appears to be positively correlated with the 
probability of product innovation. However, there are severely diminishing returns to scale, because the 
estimated coefficient is less than unity, and the squared term is significantly negative. The combined 
effect of these two coefficients of increasing employees by 1 percent at the sample mean entails less than 
a 0.07 percent increase in the probability of innovation in all models, except model (2) where the effect is 
less than 0.08 percent. The total marginal effect is equal to the coefficient on the log number of 
employees minus two times the absolute value of the coefficient on the squared term, which is -0.008 or   
  12-0.8 percent. This effect would be lower for firms that are bigger than the average. This evidence is 
inconsistent with the Market Structure hypothesis 5. It is more consistent with Information Spillovers 
models, such as Klette and Kortum (2004). The validity of hypotheses 6 and 7 is discussed below.  
Second stage results: the role of the national context 
Table 3 presents results concerning the contextual (country-level) determinants of the predicted 
probabilities of product innovation. The first three columns report results derived from the sample of 
countries with available data, the last two columns use imputed values of the business density variable to 
examine how results change in a broader sample of countries under the assumption that the underlying 
correlations among the explanatory variables remains constant (but, obviously, not necessarily the 
correlation with the dependent variable).  
[Table 3 here] 
In the first model, the strongest results concern the patent density and the institutional quality 
variables. The former appears with a positive marginal effect, thus providing support to the Information 
Spillovers hypothesis 4. The result on institutional quality is counter-intuitive, but it is logical under a 
Market Structure view whereby incumbent firms can prevent entry by competitors by requesting special 
favors from the government in ways that are not captured by the other control variables, such as 
regulations or trade policies, which are not significant in this specification.  
The second specification includes the business density variable, which reduces the sample. The 
tariff index now appears with a negative and significant coefficient. The patent and institutional variables 
retained their statistically significant effects, but the estimate of the effect of patent density is larger than 
in the previous model. The infrastructure index now appears with a surprisingly significantly negative 
coefficient, which could be a feature of the sample. When the level of development, proxied by the GDP 
per capita variable, is included, the results remain virtually unchanged.  
To study the impact of the small sample of countries in models (2) and (3), the results reported in 
columns (4) and (5) use imputed data for business density, as previously discussed. In model (4) the 
patent density and institutional variables again survive, retaining their statistical significance. The 
estimated coefficient on the patent-density variable, however, is not similar in magnitude to the estimate 
in the similarly large sample of specification (1). Also, the infrastructure index is now not statistically 
significant, suggesting that the previously discussed negative coefficient was due to the small sample. In 
the fully specified model under column (5), the tariff variable recovers some of its significance, as it is 
  13negative at the 10 percent level. The patent density variable is less significant, but remains positive and 
statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level. The growth of manufacturing GDP in years 
preceding the firm surveys is consistently estimated with a negative coefficient, which is statistically 
different from zero at the 10 percent level in specifications (2) and (3).  
The results on the regulatory index and the business density variables stand out for its lack of 
statistical significance in all of the specifications. These results indicate that the standard channels 
through which the Market Structure hypotheses are expected to be present remain ambiguous, and thus 
hypotheses 6 and 7 which posit that the effects of these variables should be ambiguous.  
Conclusions regarding the seven hypotheses 
An inter-disciplinary literature from economics and IB on Global Engagement suggests that firms 
innovate when they can import technologies and know-how from abroad. Another literature focuses on 
Information Spillover effects of innovation, be it R&D-driven innovation, product innovation driven by a 
process of “discovering” profitable products, or by adopting foreign technologies. A Market-Structure 
literature predicts both a positive and a negative relationship between incumbent-firm innovation and the 
threat of entry by competitors.  
The Global Engagement and Information Spillovers hypotheses are supported by the evidence: 
Exporting status and licensing foreign technologies seem robustly correlated with firms’ probability of 
introducing a new product, but industry-level trade-policy distortions or foreign ownership do not have an 
independent effect.  Knowledge density (the stock of patents per capita) is robustly correlated with 
product innovation rates. The evidence on Market Structure is mixed: Neither business density nor 
regulations that raise the costs of entry by firms are robustly correlated with product innovation 
probabilities. The size of firms is a significant correlate of product innovation, but the magnitude of this 
effect is small and declines with firm size. Good governance, however, tends to be negatively partially 
correlated with product innovation rates, which may reflect the ability of incumbent firms to influence 
public policy so as to deter entry through means that are not captured by the regulatory environment. That 
is, in countries with poor governance, state capture by incumbent firms might hamper entry by new firms, 
thus raising the probability of product innovation by incumbents.  
From a policy perspective, the probability of product innovation seems to be counter-cyclical, and 
thus the budgets of programs to stimulate product innovation need to be protected during downturns, so as 
to prevent the demise of firms that could have survived through retooling in terms of product innovation. 
  14The latter might have social benefits that greatly exceed the private returns, because private agents can 
benefit from the knowledge embodied in the product innovations of their competitors, as suggested by the 
Information Spillovers literature. Trade-policy distortions seem to reduce national product innovation 
rates, although it is international rather than inter-sector differences in tariffs that affect the probability of 
product innovation. Hence an open trade environment with a dynamic and dense export sector seems to 
be an important ingredient for maintaining an innovative private sector.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics by Product Innovation Status 
  Product Innovation Status   
   Yes No  Both  Yes/Both 
(%) 
   Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Total Obs.    
Variable:                       
Dummy=1 if firm has invested in R&D  12257  29.44  45.58  13549  13.55  34.23  25806  47.5 
Dummy=1 if firm uses licensed technology  12257  10.28  30.37  13549  5.15  22.11  25806  47.5 
log of total number of last year's employees 12257  4.126  1.577  13549 3.710  1.548  25806  47.5 
Dummy=1 if foreign owned (>=10 of assets)  12257 14.89  35.60  13549 11.27  31.62  25806  47.5 
Average capacity utilization over the last year  12257 74.74  20.48  13549 72.97  22.11  25806  47.5 
Dummy=1 if exporter (exports over sales >=10)  12257 38.51  48.66  13549 28.69  45.23  25806  47.5 
log average years of education of enterprise's labor 
force (imputed) 
12257 2.305  0.564  13549 2.232  0.714  25806  47.5 
log average years of education of enterprise's labor 
force 
9150 2.303  0.652  9437 2.229  0.855  18587  49.2 
Incidence of core NTBs by industry ( of tariff lines 
subject to NTBs; imputed) 
12257 7.28  14.10 13549 6.45  14.47  25806  47.5 
Incidence of core NTBs by industry ( of tariff lines 
subject to NTBs) 
8940 9.68  13.77  9813 8.88  14.03  18753  47.7 
Index of applied tariffs and their dispersion 
(imputed) 
12257 -0.127  0.506  13549 -0.022  0.721  25806  47.5 
Index of applied tariffs and their dispersion  9920  -0.153 0.534  10841  -0.027 0.787  20761  47.8 
Note: All differences in the means across the two groups are statistically significant. 
Obs. = number of observations 
Source: ICS and BEEPs surveys, www.enterprisesurveys.org.  
 
 
  18Table 2. Determinants of the Probability of Product Innovation by Incumbent Firms (Marginal Effects from the Probit Estimator) 
   (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) 
   Dependent Variable: If firm developed new product=1 
Dummy=1 if firm has invested in R&D  0.184    0.181  0.181  0.179 
   (10.69)**    (11.10)**  (11.09)**  (10.37)** 
Dummy=1 if firm uses licensed technology     0.111  0.101  0.101  0.101 
      (4.30)**  (4.32)**  (4.31)**  (4.28)** 
log of total number of last year's employees 0.075  0.086  0.073 0.073 0.075 
    (6.28)** (6.58)** (5.92)**  (5.88)**  (5.59)** 
log of total number of last year's employees squared  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
   (2.32)*  (2.33)*  (2.24)*  (2.23)*  (2.19)* 
Dummy=1 if foreign owned (>=10 of assets)  -0.012  -0.022  -0.020  -0.020  -0.022 
   (0.87)  (1.54)  (1.40)  (1.39)  (1.45) 
Average capacity utilization over the last year  0.001  0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001 
   (2.55)*  (2.37)*  (2.56)*  (2.56)*  (2.62)** 
Dummy=1 if exporter (exports over sales >=10)  0.049  0.053  0.048  0.048  0.046 
    (3.34)** (3.53)** (3.30)**  (3.23)**  (2.88)** 
log of average years of education of the enterprise's labor force  0.055  0.052  0.054  0.054  0.053 
   (2.20)*  (2.12)*  (2.17)*  (2.17)*  (2.18)* 
Index of average applied tariffs by sector and their dispersion         0.008  0.009 
          (1.05)  (1.15) 
Index of incidence of non-tariff barriers by sector         -0.046  -0.049 
          (0.71)  (0.68) 
Year, Industry (eight), and Country Dummies Included  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Manufacturing Industries  8  8  8  8  8 
Countries 68  68  68  68  58 
Observations  25806 25806 25806  25806  24362 
Observed average probability  0.475  0.475  0.475  0.475  0.477 
Predicted probability with average of explanatory variables  0.471  0.470 0.471  0.471  0.474 
* significant at 5; ** significant at 1           
Absolute value of robust z statistics in parentheses. Estimation errors are clustered by countries. 
Intercepts are not reported. Sample in model (5) excludes firms from countries with a GDP per capita (USD$ PPP) above $14,000.
Note: The results in Table 2 include the average number of years of education of workers employed by each firm. The China and Indonesia 
surveys do not have these data. We imputed this variable for the missing observations based on the observed correlation between labor education 
and the other firm characteristics. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for these variables with and without the imputed values, which have very 
similar means and standard deviations. 
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Table 3. Country-Level Determinants of the Average Predicted Probability of Product Innovation by Incumbent Firms 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   Dependent Variable: Country-Average Predicted Probability of New Product 
Explanatory Variables:                
Average tariff index  -0.104  -0.246  -0.247  -0.105  -0.124 
   (1.48)  (2.95)**  (3.93)**  (1.20)  (1.74) 
Average core NTB coverage ratio  -0.039  0.018  0.019  -0.039  -0.096 
   (0.17)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.20)  (0.45) 
Real manufacturing GDP growth  -0.402  -0.499  -0.504  -0.402  -0.419 
   (1.42)  (1.94)  (1.91)  (1.64)  (1.56) 
log of cumulative patent density (per 
capita) 0.030  0.055  0.054  0.031  0.027 
   (1.98)*  (3.56)**  (3.46)**  (2.38)*  (1.71) 
Index of entry/exit regulation  0.018  -0.012  -0.013  0.018  0.013 
   (0.41)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.40)  (0.25) 
Index of institutional quality  -0.061  -0.064  -0.065  -0.061  -0.066 
   (2.18)*  (2.79)**  (2.19)*  (3.19)**  (2.28)* 
Index of infrastructure  -0.004  -0.125  -0.13  -0.004  -0.051 
   (0.08)  (2.46)*  (1.92)  (0.10)  (0.79) 
log of business density     -0.005  -0.006      
      (0.19)  (0.26)      
log of real GDP per capita (PPP)       0.009    0.058 
        (0.13)    (1.09) 
Imputed log of business density         -0.001  -0.006 
          (0.04)  (0.16) 
Constant 0.811  1.083  0.992  0.814  0.293 
   (4.45)**  (5.60)**  -1.58  (5.16)**  (0.59) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.15  0.42  0.40  0.13  0.15  
Observations 57  39  39  57  56 
z statistics in parentheses; standard errors are bootstrapped with 50 random iterations for all estimations.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Note: We imputed the values for the trade-policy indicators for the countries without such data, so as to increase the sample of countries that 
appears in the econometric estimation reported in Table 3. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for these variables with and without the imputed 
values, which have very similar means and standard deviations. Data Appendix 
 
Table A1. Number of Firms by Countries and Survey Years  










of Firms with 
New Product** 
1  Albania (2000, 2004)  137 0.53  58.39 58.36 
2  Argentina (2006)  642 2.49  75.08 75.10 
3  Armenia (2002, 2005)  290 1.12  50.69 50.60 
4  Azerbaijan (2002, 2005)  257 1.00  56.42 56.28 
5  Belarus (2002, 2005)  97 0.38  75.26 75.26 
6  Benin (2004)  142 0.55  34.51 34.30 
7  Bolivia (2006)  362 1.40  75.97 75.89 





9  Brazil (2003)  1,628 6.31  67.57 67.44 
10  Bulgaria (2002, 2005)  106 0.41  61.32 61.19 
11  Cambodia (2003)  55 0.21  63.64 63.50 
12  Chile (2004)  684 2.65  44.88 44.77 
13  China (2003)  1,324 5.13  26.28 26.29 
14  Colombia (2006)  634 2.46  68.77 68.80 
15  Costa Rica (2005)  339 1.31  52.51 52.49 
16  Croatia (2002, 2005)  106 0.41  52.83 52.73 




18  Ecuador (2003)  123 0.48  63.41 63.21 




20  El Salvador (2003)  462 1.79  62.12 62.02 
21  Estonia (2002, 2005)  67 0.26  53.73 53.67 
22  Georgia (2002, 2005)  83 0.32  35.00 34.99 
23  Germany* (2005)  220 0.85  45.78 45.82 
24  Greece* (2005)  94 0.36  41.49 41.47 
25  Guatemala (2003)  435 1.69  54.02 53.92 
26  Guyana (2004)  149 0.58  46.31 46.40 
27  Honduras (2003)  442 1.71  46.83 46.74 
28  Hungary (2002, 2005)  405 1.57  33.83 33.92 
29  Indonesia (2003)  595 2.31  35.29 35.14 
30  Ireland* (2005)  172 0.67  51.16 51.19 




32  Korea, Rep.* (2005)  213 0.83  46.01 45.93 




34  Latvia (2002, 2005)  59 0.23  44.07 43.96 




36  Macedonia, FYR (2002,  99 0.38  46.46 46.40 










of Firms with 
New Product** 
2005) 
37  Madagascar (2005)  269 1.04  38.66 39.46 
38  Malawi (2005)  153 0.59  53.59 53.51 
39  Mali (2003)  70 0.27  37.14 37.13 
40  Mauritius (2005)  160 0.62  48.75 49.29 
41  Mexico (2006)  1,117 4.33  34.38 34.28 




43  Nepal (2000)  207 0.80  6.76 6.82 
44  Nicaragua (2003)  448 1.74  47.54 47.49 
45  Oman* (2003)  91 0.35  36.26 36.18 
46  Panama (2006)  236 0.91  55.93 55.95 
47  Paraguay (2006)  375 1.45  67.73 67.86 
48  Peru (2006)  360 1.40  77.78 77.94 
49  Philippines (2003)  633 2.45  48.34 48.28 




51  Portugal* (2005)  130 0.50  27.69 27.75 
52  Romania (2002, 2005)  468 1.81  37.18 37.09 












56  Slovenia* (2002, 2005)  104 0.40  38.46 38.48 
57  South Africa (2003)  562 2.18  68.51 68.55 
58  Spain* (2005)  134 0.52  42.54 42.36 








61  Tanzania (2003)  172 0.67  35.47 35.25 
62  Thailand (2004)  1,377 5.34  50.40 50.35 
63  Turkey (2002, 2005)  1,572 6.09  36.32 36.34 
64  Ukraine (2002, 2005)  316 1.22  64.87 64.90 
65  Uruguay (2006)  351 1.36  66.95 67.05 




67  Vietnam (2005)  1,396 5.41  42.12 42.07 
68  Zambia (2002)  84 0.33  55.95 55.70 
  Totals 25,806  100.00  48.84  48.81 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys database, 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
* Countries with real GDP per capita > $14,000 (PPP), which are not in sample of model (5) in Table 2. 
** Predictions from model 4 in Table 2, which are used as the dependent variable in models of Table 3.  
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Data Sources for Industry-Trade-Policy and Country-Level Variables Used in Regressions 
Presented in Table 3. 
 
Tariff Index: The composite index was estimated as the first principal component derived from factor 
analysis of the trade-weighted applied tariffs and their standard deviations within each 
manufacturing industry. The data come from Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). The cross-country 
regressions use national averages of the industry averages.  
NTB Coverage Rate: The variable measures the percentage of tariff lines that are subject to non-tariff 
barriers, which includes price-control measures, finance-control measures, and quantity-control 
measures. The data come from Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). The cross-country regressions use 
national averages of the industry averages.  
GDP per capita in 2000: Penn World Tables database. 
Average Real Manufacturing GDP growth 1998-2003: The data come from the World Bank’s database 
on World Development Indicators (WDI). 
Stock of patents accumulated during 1963-2000 per worker: The variable is the total number of utility 
patents granted to the first innovator residing in each country and cited in the patent application at 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) during this period. The data come from 
Lederman and Saenz (2005). The number of workers is the population 15-64 years of age in 
2000. These data come from the World Bank’s WDI.  
Regulation Index:  The composite index was estimated as the first principal component derived from 
factor analysis of the Difficulty of Firing Index, Difficulty of Hiring Index and Starting a 
Business Time (Days). These variables are the average by country for the years 2003, 2004, and 
2005 (although some of these years may be missing for some variables for some countries). The 
data come from the World Bank’s Doing Business database.  
Infrastructure Index: The composite index was estimated as the first principal component derived from 
factor analysis of the Total Road Length in 2001 (km) (per square km of surf. area) and Main 
Telephone Lines (per 1000 habitants) in 2001. The data come from the World Bank’s WDI.  
Institutional Index: The composite index was estimated as the first principal component derived from 
factor analysis of the Control of Corruption, Political Stability, and the Rule of Law. The data 
come from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005). 
Business density. Data are from Djankov et al. (2007). This variable is defined as the number of firms per 
capita by country. 
 
 
 
 
 